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Abstract: Financial crises have detrimental impacts on the economy via depressed economic growth
and rising unemployment, however, their impact on the poorest in society is relatively under-
researched. This paper investigates the impact of three different types of ﬁnancial crises on the income
of the poor. Using a variety of estimation techniques and controlling for a lagged dependent variable,
the results suggest that currency crises are the most harmful to the poor, followed by banking crises.
Debt crises only have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the income of the poor in richer countries.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Whilst it is acknowledged that ﬁnancial crises are harmful to the well-being of a country’s
citizens, little research has been carried out to quantify these effects. Notably, the effects of
ﬁnancial crises may differ across the income distribution; and this study examines their
impact on the poor, who usually have limited resources at their disposal to insulate from
such negative shocks.
We investigate episodes of banking, currency and debt crises using a new database from
Laeven and Valencia (2013) and measure the well-being of the poor as the income of the
lowest quintile in a population. This permits us to study crises in developed, as well as
under-developed nations, as ﬁnancial crises are not just limited to developing countries.
In our speciﬁcations, using a System GMM estimator with a lagged dependent variable,
we show that currency crises reduce the income of the poor by 14.9%, followed by 10.6%
for banking crises. Only in richer countries do we ﬁnd that debt crises inﬂuence the income
of the poor. In addition, including a lagged dependent variable in the speciﬁcation is
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important, as numerous papers that study the effect of average growth on the income of the
poor (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Rewilak, 2013) omit this variable. This may lead to the model
being misspeciﬁed. Nevertheless, the results conﬁrm that whilst the short run coefﬁcient
falls in size, in the long run, increases in average growth may be good for the poor, adding
a further valuable contribution to the literature.
Financial crises are associated with periods of macroeconomic instability that disrupt the
normal functioning of the economy. Furthermore, during severe economic downturns, as
output falls below its natural rate, unemployment increases, and usually the ﬁrst workers
to lose their jobs, are the low skilled poor. The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 began with problems
in the banking sector, but as public debt increased to bail out ﬁnancial institutions, debt
crises emerged with further negative repercussions for the poor. In Greece, a prolonged
period of austerity reduced the state’s ability to create adequate safety nets for those in
need, further depressing their welfare.
Laeven and Valencia (2013) outline three different types of crises in their paper;
however, other types of ﬁnancial crises exist, such as asset bubbles and inﬂation crises.1
We focus on banking, currency and debt crises, all which may have their own independent
effects on the poor. However, these different types of crises may occur simultaneously, or
one crisis may bring about the onset of another.
Financial development is shown to be poverty reducing, where studies ﬁnd that ﬁnancial
deepening and increasing ﬁnancial access to the poor may reduce poverty, (Burgess &
Pande, 2005; Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, & Levine, 2007). Despite these ﬁndings, as ﬁnancial
development increases, there is often an unintended consequence occurring simultaneously
—ﬁnancial instability, (Akhter & Daly, 2009; Guillaumont Jeanneney & Kpodar, 2011).
Financial instability may be harmful to society as it may disrupt payment systems and
harm long term growth. Moreover, it is usually the poor that are more vulnerable to
disruptions in the ﬁnancial system compared to the rich. When the ﬁnancial system suffers
a negative shock, banks begin to hoard liquidity resulting in a credit crunch.2 This may
damage society both in the short and long term. As banks increase their cost of credit to
recoup lost interest income (and increase proﬁts), short term borrowing costs may rise,
but additionally, current reductions in credit reduce long run investment, harming long
run growth. In severe cases, when conﬁdence in the banking sector completely evaporates,
bank runs and capital ﬂight may occur that require immediate resolution. These may
include strict capital controls and short term bank closures until policy restores conﬁdence
in the banking sector.3 These extreme measures are not only disruptive to the overall
functioning of the economy, but may severely harm the poor who may not have access
to other assets unlike the rich to help them during such times.
A currency crisis is deﬁned as a substantial devaluation or depreciation in the nominal
value of a currency, and this may have severe consequences for the poor. In particular, a
weakened currency makes imported goods more expensive. If imported goods have
inelastic demand, (food, energy and other necessities) the large surge in inﬂation may be
harmful to the economy. As the poor usually spend a far greater proportion of their overall
income on such necessities, they may be hardest hit. In addition, as the poorest in society
are often in low paid jobs with little bargaining power, or are on ﬁxed incomes such as
1See (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009) for the various types of crises and their deﬁnitions.
2With under capitalised banks, low proﬁtability and uncertainty about credit quality, banks may hoard liquidity by
restricting lending until market conditions become clearer and the shock passes.
3During the Cypriot crisis of 2013, banks were closed for 2 weeks and a monthly cap was put in place on transfers
to foreign banks.
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pensions, inﬂation will reduce their purchasing power. In poor countries where the state is
a major employer, during a currency crisis, if the state is servicing foreign denominated
debt, these effects may be ampliﬁed as the government seeks cost saving measures. A
further way that the citizens may be harmed by a currency crisis is when the government
attempts to defend its currency. By raising domestic interest rates, policymakers may
prevent capital outﬂows; however, this comes at a cost. As interest rates increase to protect
the currency, local citizens now face higher repayments on personal debt, which was a
common feature during the East Asian crisis in 1997.
Debt crises may be both internal and external, but their effects on domestic citizens, in
particular the poor are similar. Repayment of public debt requires either a reduction in
government spending or a tax increase or a combination of both. If income tax increases
are progressive, they may not be fully felt by the poor, but increases in consumption tax
will affect all citizens.4 The poor may feel this tax increase more than the rich, as their
marginal propensity to consume would theoretically be greater than their richer
counterparts. The other method that a government has at its disposal to manage a debt
crisis is to implement austerity programmes and cut public spending. For example, a
government may freeze public sector wages and reduce pro-poor expenditure such as
healthcare and education. As afﬂuent members of society may not use such public services
(they can afford private health insurance, send their children to fee-paying schools), the
consequences of lower public spending is yet another way the poor may be harmed due
to debt crises.
Financial crises usually reduce average incomes, and Demetriades, Rousseau and
Rewilak (2017) ﬁnd that banking crises are negatively related with economic growth. If
increases in average income growth are associated with like-for-like increases in the
income growth of the poor (Dollar & Kraay, 2002), the poor will be harmed with lower
incomes during crisis episodes. On the other hand, Baldacci, de Mello and Inchauste
(2002) propose that as the poorest in society do not own property, or other tangible assets
that may lose a signiﬁcant amount of their nominal value during a crisis, they may not
ultimately feel the burden of ﬁnancial crises. Nevertheless, the authors do suggest that
when formal sector workers lose their jobs due to a crisis, they may enter the informal
sector. If those entering the informal sector are better educated, more productive and
efﬁcient, then they may drive their poorer competitors out of the market. If this occurs,
once again, it is the poorest in society who lose out.
There are several studies that examine the impact of ﬁnancial crises on the poor’s
welfare. Gerry, Mickiewicz and Nikoloski (2014) show that currency crises may increase
mortality rates, as when the poor suffer negative income shocks associated with crises,
combined with increases in food prices, their nutritional levels fall and their health levels
deteriorate. Additionally, Habib, Narayan, Olivieri and Sanchez (2010) ﬁnd that due to
the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis, poverty reduction slowed in the Philippines and actually
increased in Mexico. These results compliment Chen and Ravallion (2009) who show that
at the aggregate level, the 2007 crisis will add a further 53 million people to the number
living below $1.25 a day globally, and that whilst aggregate poverty rates are still expected
to fall over time, they will do so at a slower rate.
This paper adds to the literature by quantifying the effect of three different crises on the
income of the poorest quintile. Rather than focusing on just one speciﬁc crisis episode, it
4In the United Kingdom, ad valorem tax was increased to 20 per cent in January 2011 as the government looked to
boost tax revenues to cut its deﬁcit.
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differentiates itself from the literature by focusing on all past banking, currency and debt
crises across multiple countries from 1973 to 2011. The rest of this paper is organised as
follows: Section 2 introduces the empirical strategy used in this paper, outlining the
methods and data. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Equation (1) shows the benchmark estimation technique, ﬁxed effects (FE). In Equation (1)
and all subsequent equations, (i) subscripts for individual countries, (t) subscripts for
individual years, where (α) and (β) are parameters to be estimated. The term (αi) represents
a country speciﬁc intercept, and the dependent variable is denoted (Y). Our variable of
interest (C) denotes the different types of ﬁnancial crises, and matrix (X) contains our
covariates. The random error term (ϵ) is denoted.
As we anticipate that our explanatory variables will be correlated with the error term,
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) will be biased and inconsistent, and therefore we
prefer the ﬁxed effects estimator. Whilst a random effects estimator may account for the
panel structure of the data, it too may be inconsistent. A Hausman test may be used to
determine the consistency of random effects, but regardless of the result, as we believe
our covariates are correlated with the error term, we use the ﬁxed effects estimator.
Y i;t ¼ αi þ β1Ci;t þ β2X i;t þ ϵi;t (1)
In Equation (1), we assume our variable of interest (C) to be exogenous for the
following reasons. First, ﬁnancial crises occur in both developed and developing countries,
therefore income or poverty should have no inﬂuence on whether a crisis will occur or
not.5 Likewise, ﬁnancial crises occur in both equal and unequal societies, thus we argue
that simultaneity bias is not an issue. Second, we treat ﬁnancial crises as exogenous
because they are unpredictable. If crises were predictable, then both national governments
and multilateral agencies would do their utmost to prevent them from occurring. Hence, we
can treat crises as a random shock.
In Equation (2), a lagged dependent variable is introduced to the empirical speciﬁcation.
As the dependent variable, the income of the poor, is partly determined by inequality
which changes slowly through time, we believe previous values of the dependent variable
may be strong predictors of its current value. Leaving this unaddressed may bias the
estimates, but using a ﬁxed effects estimator with a lagged dependent variable may
introduce a different type of bias into the estimates (Nickell, 1981), which only disappears
as (T) tends to inﬁnity. However, the System GMM estimator proposed by (Blundell &
Bond, 1998) overcomes this problem. This estimator may also alleviate any remaining
endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variables. In addition, this estimator still
controls for country speciﬁc effects, but also permits the estimation of time invariant
variables, something the ﬁxed effects estimator cannot do.
5Banking crises have occurred in developing countries such as Venezuela in 1994 and similarly the global
ﬁnancial crisis in 2007 hit a plethora of developed nations. Currency crises have hit developing countries/
emerging markets such East Asia 1997 and also developed nations, for example, Italy 1993. Finally, developing
nations such as Mexico in 1993 have had debt crises and recently developed nations such as the PIIGS (Portugal,
Ireland, Iceland, Greece and Spain) have found themselves on the cusp of debt crises.
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Y i;t ¼ αi þ γY i;t1 þ β1Ci;t þ β2X i;t þ ϵi;t (2)
ΔY i;t ¼ γΔY i;t1 þ β1ΔCi;t þ β2ΔX i;t þ Δϵi;t (3)
The System GMM estimator is shown in Equations (2) and (3). This estimator tests the
relationship between ﬁnancial crises and the income of the poor as a system; and for it to
be valid, it requires that several diagnostic tests are satisﬁed. First, the estimator is designed
for a large number of cross sections and a smaller time dimension. In this paper, the
number of cross sections is 61 and the average number of time periods equals 9 satisfying
both conditions. The estimator requires the presence of ﬁrst order serial correlation;
however, it requires no second order serial correlation. In addition, the estimator uses
internal instruments to identify the parameters. In the level equation, the internal
instruments used are lagged differences of the endogenous variables and in the differenced
equation; the lagged levels are used as instruments. The System GMM estimator also
allows for external instruments to be used in the speciﬁcation, in addition to any internal
instruments. In a recent paper examining ﬁnancial crises and mortality, Gerry et al.
(2014) include regional dummies as external instruments and this paper follows this
approach. The validity of the instruments may be tested using the Hansen test, where a
non-rejection of the null hypothesis indicates instrument validity. A further aspect of this
estimator is that it has a bias versus efﬁciency trade off. Whilst more instruments increase
the efﬁciency of the estimator, a large instrument count can overﬁt the endogenous
variables and bias the results. As there is no ideal instrument count, the literature
recommends that the number of instruments do not exceed the total number of cross
sections.6
We empirically address our research question using annual data for 61 countries from
1973 to 2011. The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Our crisis data comes from
Laeven and Valencia (2013), and a value of one is assigned if a crisis has occurred in a
country in a given year and zero otherwise. The authors categorise crises into three
distinctive types: banking crises, currency crises and debt crises. The remaining variables
used in this study are available from the World Development Indicators website via the
6For further information regarding this estimator, we direct the reader to Baltagi (2008).
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Income of the poor 11.10 1.14 7.94 13.44
GDP per capita 9.35 0.86 7.26 11.42
Private credit 3.64 0.89 1.68 5.74
Trade openness 91.35 44.11 15.64 348.39
Government spending 16.46 4.60 5.63 28.06
Inﬂation rate 3.01 1.14 11.99 1.41
Bank crisis 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Currency crisis 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Debt crisis 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00
The following variables are entered as their natural logarithms as presented previously; income of the poor, GDP
per capita, and private credit. The inﬂation rate is ﬁrst transformed so all values are positive and then logged.
Trade openness and government spending are ratios to GDP and the crises variables are all dummy variables
taking a value equal to 1 if a crisis occurred and 0 otherwise.
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World Bank. We select our control variables following Gerry et al. (2014) and these
variables are standard in the literature, appearing in many growth, poverty and other
macroeconomic studies.
We control for GDP per capita and in its level form, the variable is highly skewed. As a
result, we take its natural logarithm which creates a more normal distribution. Moreover,
this allows us to compare our results with Dollar and Kraay (2002) who also apply a
logarithmic transform to this variable. Dollar and Kraay (2002) ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient
on this variable is equal to one, suggesting that any increase in average income is
associated with an analogous increase in the income of the poor. Furthermore, we control
for ﬁnancial sector size using the natural logarithm of private credit. We include it in the
speciﬁcation as numerous studies show that providing ﬁnance to the poor may indeed
reduce poverty, (Akhter & Daly, 2009; Ang, 2010). Trade openness is measured as the
sum of exports and imports divided by GDP and government spending is measured using
ﬁnal government expenditure divided by GDP. The expected sign on government
spending is ambiguous. Whilst pro-poor government spending may be beneﬁcial for
poverty reduction, and redistribution programmes may reduce inequality, excess
government consumption has found to reduce economic growth in a plethora of studies.
Moreover, if government spending is not pro-poor, with high amounts attached to
national defence, or spending on gentriﬁcation aimed at the middle and upper classes,
then this variable could enter the speciﬁcations negatively. To generate the inﬂation
variable we trim the data at the 1st and 99th percentile to remove inﬂuential
observations. We then add one to the variable so all values are strictly positive and take
its natural logarithm. We expect the inﬂation rate to enter the speciﬁcations negatively,
as the poor are usually on ﬁxed incomes and do not have access to ﬁnancial
instruments that overcome the negative effects of inﬂation. As a result, the poor’s
purchasing power would fall as would their real income. In extreme cases, the poor
may spend their time on cash management, as opposed to focusing on productive
activity that may help them generate income.
3 RESULTS
Tables 2–4 present the benchmark ﬁndings. Each table examines the effect of a different
type of crisis on the income of the poor. Columns 1–3 present the ﬁxed effects estimates,
whereas columns 4–6 introduce a lagged dependent variable into the speciﬁcation and are
estimated using System GMM. The diagnostics of the System GMM estimates are
presented at the bottom of each table where p-values are reported for the AR(1) and
AR(2) test of serial correlation and for the Hansen test of instrument validity.
Table 2 presents the results for banking crises where column 1 estimates a bivariate
regression, column 2 adds the covariates GDP per capita and private credit and column
3 adds the remaining control variables. In the bivariate regression, the banking crisis
variable is insigniﬁcant, but in the following two regressions, it enters with a negative
and signiﬁcant sign. In columns 2 and 3, the only additional covariate that is signiﬁcant
is GDP per capita. The results suggest that a 1% increase in average income transcends into
a 1.15–1.19% increase in the income of the poor.
Columns 4–6 replicate the results from the previous three columns in Table 2. In the
bivariate regression, banking crises enter with a negative and signiﬁcant sign, a result that
holds in the latter two columns. In the ﬁnal and preferred speciﬁcation, the results suggest
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that a banking crisis may reduce the income of the poor by 10.6%.7 When introducing a
lagged dependent variable into the speciﬁcation, the short run elasticity of average income
falls to 0.37% in column 5 and 0.13% in column 6. Private credit, whilst insigniﬁcant in
column 5 is negative and signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal column, whilst trade openness and
government spending are statistically signiﬁcant in column 6. The diagnostics are well
satisﬁed in columns 4–6, where in all three regressions, there is evidence of ﬁrst order
serial correlation and the null hypothesis of second order serial correlation is rejected
(p-values range from 0.13–0.25). The p-value of the Hansen test exceeds the traditional
level in all three regressions indicating that the instruments appear to be valid.
Furthermore, the number of instruments does not exceed the number of cross sections as
proposed by Baltagi (2008).
Table 3 presents the results when the variable of interest is a currency crisis. In the
bivariate regression, the currency crisis dummy is negative and signiﬁcant as anticipated
and this result holds across columns 2 and3. Similar to Table 2, the only covariate in
columns 2 and 3 that enters signiﬁcantly is average income with an elasticity ranging from
1.10–1.19.
In columns 4–6, the currency crisis dummy is negative and signiﬁcant, and the results
suggest that a currency crisis may reduce the income of the poor between 9% and 15%,
where the highest magnitude is in column 6. In column 5, both controls average income
and trade openness are positive and signiﬁcant, as is the lagged dependent variable.
However, once including the remaining covariates in the ﬁnal column, trade openness
becomes insigniﬁcant. The diagnostics for the models in the ﬁnal three columns of
Table 3 are well satisﬁed as there is no presence of second order serial correlation and
the Hansen test shows the instruments appear to be valid. The instrument set is the same
as in Table 2 and does not exceed the number of cross sections.
Table 4 examines the impact of debt crises on the income of the poor. The bivariate
regression in column 1 suggests that a debt crisis may reduce the poor’s income by
24%. However, once average income and government spending enter the regression, the
coefﬁcient becomes insigniﬁcant. In column 3, when a full set of controls are used, the
only variable that is signiﬁcant is average income. The results suggest that a 1% in average
incomes may increase the income of the poor by 1.19%, similar to the corresponding
regressions in Tables 2 and 3.
Columns 4–6 present the results using the System GMM estimator. As in the previous
Tables, the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly signiﬁcant across all three
columns. Whilst entering with its expected negative sign, the debt crisis variable is
statistically insigniﬁcant in columns 4–6. In the preferred regression in column 6, the
results suggest that increases in average income are good for the poor. In particular, a
1% increase in average income is associated with a 0.13% increase in the income of the
poor when examining the short run marginal effect. The Hansen test shows that the
instruments appear to be valid in all three speciﬁcations, with p-values ranging from
0.11–0.37. In all three columns, the diagnostics show that there is no presence of second
order serial correlation. Furthermore, the number of cross sections exceeds the instrument
count as recommended in the literature.
Table 5 presents the ﬁrst set of robustness tests. Until now, each crisis was entered on
its own in the regressions; however, the different types of ﬁnancial crises studied in this
7Column 6 is the preferred speciﬁcation because it contains a full set of controls, including the lagged dependent
variable, which is shown to be very important based on its high statistical signiﬁcance.
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paper may occur simultaneously. Table 5 contains three columns. In column 1, only the
three different types of crises are entered into the regression along with the lagged
dependent variable. Column 2 then adds the remaining covariates into the regression
speciﬁcation. Finally, column 3 re-estimates the regression in column 2 using a smaller
instrument set.
In column 1, it is evident that both banking and currency crises are negative and
signiﬁcant, whereas debt crises, although negative in sign, are insigniﬁcantly related to
the income of the poor. Examining the results from column 2, only trade openness, debt
crises and the inﬂation rate are insigniﬁcant, where both banking and currency crises retain
their negative signs. However, by including an extra two variables in the speciﬁcation, the
number of instruments exceeds the number of cross sections. According to Baltagi (2008)
having the number of instruments exceed, the number of cross sections may overﬁt the
endogenous regressors and bias the results. Therefore in column 3, the number of
instruments is reduced and the regression in column 2 is re-estimated. The results show
that the coefﬁcients in column 3 are very similar to those in column 2 providing conﬁdence
in the results. In column 3, the results suggest that banking crises may reduce the income of
the poor by approximately 10% and currency crises reduce the income of the poor by 14%.
The coefﬁcients are similar in size to those in the previous tables, and it can be conﬁdently
stated, that the impact of ﬁnancial crises on the income of the poor was not over-estimated
in the previous tables.
Table 6 examines whether the effects of ﬁnancial crises differ depending on the level of
ﬁnancial development, trade openness or government expenditure. Therefore, Table 6
includes interaction terms between the different types of crises and these variables.
Table 5. Effect of all three crises on the income of the poor
(1) (2) (3)
Banking crisis dummy 0.040b (2.14) 0.091c (2.86) 0.100c (3.87)
Currency crisis dummy 0.093a (1.87) 0.139b (2.35) 0.140c (2.84)
Debt crisis dummy 0.048 (0.56) 0.012 (0.19) 0.025 (0.37)
(Ln) GDP per capita 0.130c (4.51) 0.136c (4.44)
(Ln) Private credit 0.070c (3.18) 0.070c (3.05)
Trade openness 0.001 (1.62) 0.001b (2.56)
Government spending 0.014c (3.64) 0.015c (3.67)
(Ln) Inﬂation 0.009 (0.91) 0.014 (1.45)
(Ln) Lag income of poor 0.990c (193.99) 0.987c (48.70) 0.989c (44.99)
Number of instruments 33 68 59
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.20 0.13 0.12
Hansen p-value 0.18 0.66 0.37
Cross sections 61 61 61
Observations 514 514 514
Technique SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
Each column represents a different regression and all models estimated using robust standard errors. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses.
adenotes the 10% statistical signiﬁcance level
bdenotes the 5% statistical signiﬁcance level
cdenotes the 1% statistical signiﬁcance level
AR(1) is the test for ﬁrst order serial correlation and AR(2) is the test for second order serial correlation. The
Hansen test examines the validity of the instruments, where a non-rejection indicates valid instruments. We use
regional dummy variables as instruments in addition to internal instruments for all the regressions.
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In column 1, the banking crisis dummy is interacted with private credit, as banking
crises may potentially harm the poor more in underdeveloped banking systems compared
to well-developed banking sectors. This is because well-developed banking sectors usually
have greater provisions in place that may safeguard customer deposits, or even be better
equipped to keep lending through turbulent times. The results show that whilst the crisis
dummy retains its negative sign and statistical signiﬁcance, the interaction term between
banking crises and credit is insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless, the interaction term is positive,
which implies that larger ﬁnancial sectors may reduce the negative impact of a banking
crisis on the income of the poor. All the remaining covariates are statistically signiﬁcant,
with signs consistent from the previous estimations, with the exception of the inﬂation rate.
In column 2, the currency crisis dummy is interacted with trade openness, as the impact
of a crisis on the income of the poor, may depend on the openness of an economy. As in
column 1, the crisis dummy is negative and signiﬁcant with a magnitude similar to previous
estimates, although the interaction term is positive and insigniﬁcant. The positive
coefﬁcient on the interaction term suggests that similar to banking crises, the more open
an economy is, the less damaging a currency crisis may be to the income of the poor. A
crisis that devalues the currency may be a blessing if it makes a country more competitive
internationally. In export-oriented labour intensive industries, following a depreciation in
the currency, product demand may increase. The knock on effect here may increase
employment or wages in this sector. As it is usually the poor who work in such sectors, then
they may actually beneﬁt from a currency devaluation. The control variables in column 2
are very similar to those in column 1, where only the inﬂation rate enters insigniﬁcantly.
Table 6. Financial crises and the income of the poor: Interaction terms
(1) (2) (3)
Crisis dummy 0.158c (2.95) 0.148c (2.60) 0.097 (1.20)
Crisis × private credit 0.054 (1.32)
Crisis × trade openness 0.005 (0.89)
Crisis × government spending 0.002 (0.13)
(Ln) GDP per capita 0.136c (3.53) 0.137c (3.96) 0.126c (3.30)
(Ln) Private credit 0.082c (3.47) 0.093c (3.58) 0.088c (3.63)
Trade openness 0.001b (2.30) 0.001c (3.00) 0.001c (3.18)
Government spending 0.016c (4.24) 0.017c (4.89) 0.018c (4.90)
(Ln) Inﬂation 0.005 (0.49) 0.003 (0.31) 0.000 (0.04)
(Ln) Lag income of poor 0.986c (34.37) 0.984c (48.36) 0.990c (36.45)
Number of instruments 54 54 54
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.17 0.16 0.16
Hansen p-value 0.25 0.21 0.19
Cross sections 61 61 61
Observations 514 514 514
Technique SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
Each column represents a different regression and all models estimated using robust standard errors. Columns 1
reports results for banking crises, column 2 for currency crises and columns 3 for debt crises. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
adenotes the 10% statistical signiﬁcance level
bdenotes the 5% statistical signiﬁcance level
cdenotes the 1% statistical signiﬁcance level
AR(1) is the test for ﬁrst order serial correlation and AR(2) is the test for second order serial correlation. The
Hansen test examines the validity of the instruments, where a non-rejection indicates valid instruments. We use
regional dummy variables as instruments in addition to internal instruments for all the regressions.
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The ﬁnal column of Table 6 interacts debt crises with government spending. The impact
of a debt crisis on the poor may be greater in countries with higher government spending as
opposed to countries with lower spending. For example, if government expenditure is
close to zero, then further reductions in spending due to a crisis would be negligible and
may not impact society compared with larger reductions in government spending. The
results suggest that the coefﬁcient on debt crises is negative and insigniﬁcant, as is the
interaction term. Furthermore, the remaining covariates are consistent with the previous
two regressions. The diagnostics in Table 6 are all well satisﬁed with Hansen p-values
all exceeding 0.19. There is no presence of second order serial correlation with AR(2)
p-values between 0.16–0.17 and in all three speciﬁcations the number of cross sections
exceeds the instrument count.
Table 7 examines whether the effects of ﬁnancial crises on the income of the poor is
homogeneous across the large number of countries. As the System GMM estimator
requires that the number of cross sections is large, splitting the sample into multiple
income groups or geographic regions would violate this assumption. As a result, the
sample was split to investigate the effects of the three types of ﬁnancial crises on the
poorest 30 countries in the sample and richest 31 countries in the sample. Columns 1
and 2 present the results for banking crises, columns 3 and 4 for currency crises and the
ﬁnal two columns examine the effects of debt crises.
Columns 1 and 2 show that banking crises are harmful to the poor’s income, both in
poorer and richer countries in the sample. The magnitude for poorer countries is
approximately 9%, whereas for richer countries it is close to 13%. This is an interesting
ﬁnding as it may capture the fact that in some of the poorest nations in the world, many
citizens do not have access to formal ﬁnancial services. Therefore, if a banking crisis
occurs, the poor who are excluded from ﬁnance may not face as serious consequences as
those who are included in the ﬁnancial system, possibly explaining the difference in the
magnitude of the coefﬁcients.
In the middle two columns, the results are very similar to columns 1 and 2 where a
currency crisis will reduce the income of the poor in both poorer and richer countries.
However, the impact on poorer countries is lower than that of richer countries, an
interesting ﬁnding which may potentially be explained for the following reasons. First,
as it is usually richer countries who engage in international capital markets, and as
currency devaluations increase foreign denominated debt, only participants in such
markets will be harmed via this channel. Additionally, imported inﬂation, another
consequence of currency devaluations, may be better overcome by low income households
in poorer countries compared with low income households in richer countries. In
developing economies, with a greater reliance on agriculture and the experience to trade
using a barter economy, the poor may be able to avoid dealing with cash whose value is
frequently changing and falling. On the other hand, in OECD nations, due to the
industrialised nature of their economies, the poor may not have such options readily
available to them, as most of the individuals in the lowest income quintile would be
working in secondary or tertiary sectors and would be paid in cash, rather than in goods
and services.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 show the impact of debt crises on the income of the poor is
negative and signiﬁcant only in the richer sub-sample of countries. In previous estimates
debt crises were always insigniﬁcant, thus, splitting the sample unearths a further
important ﬁnding. However, as richer economies may be in a better position to target the
poor with the governmental expenditure, this result is not overly surprising.
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The diagnostics are generally satisﬁed in Table 7. However, because the sample was
split and the number of cross sections reduced, in order to avoid overﬁtting the endogenous
regressors, the instrument set had to be reduced. This was performed by treating only
average income, the ﬁnancial crises and the lagged dependent variable as endogenous.
Therefore, it is important to treat the ﬁndings in Table 7 with caution.
Overall, the results show that different types of crises may have different impacts on the
income of the poor. In the preferred speciﬁcations, both bank and currency crises
negatively inﬂuence the income of the poor, but debt crises only have a negative and
signiﬁcant effect for the richest countries in the sample. Examining the covariates, private
credit is found to be harmful in raising the income of the poor. This is somewhat surprising
as ﬁnance has been shown to be beneﬁcial in poverty reduction. However, studies show
that there are certain conditions for ﬁnance to be pro-growth and pro-poor. Rewilak
(2013) shows that whilst increasing ﬁnancial sector development may reduce poverty in
certain worldwide regions, in others it may detrimental. Rioja and Valev (2004) show that
ﬁnance is most beneﬁcial for growth in middle income countries, a result that may extend
to poverty reduction, potentially explaining this ﬁnding.8 This ﬁnding is well demonstrated
in Table 7 as ﬁnance is only negative and signiﬁcant in the subsample of poorer countries.
Government spending also enters negatively in the speciﬁcations but this is not overly
surprising. Increases in government spending such as redistribution programmes may
increase the incomes of the poor, but if this spending fails to reach the target population,
or if the government engages in wasteful expenditure, for example beautifying government
buildings, it may be harmful to the income of the poor if their taxes are paying for such
projects.
4 CONCLUSION
This study investigates whether ﬁnancial crises have a negative impact on the income of
the lowest quintile. This permits us to examine the role of ﬁnancial crises on the poor in
both developed and developing countries. Three different types of crises are examined in
this analysis, which include banking, currency and debt crises.
The results show that a banking crisis may harm the income of the poor by 10.6%. When
the banking system comes under distress, methods of payment may shut down. If the poor
are relying on ﬁnancial institutions for remitted payments, they may suffer from temporary
income shortfalls, or may have to use more expensive methods to receive their funds,
which in turn will reduce the total payment received. Bank closures may result in a
shortage of liquidity and as a method to cope, the poor may sell off their non-monetary
assets, possibly at a discount, jeopardising their wealth. Finally, if a ﬁnancial institution
becomes insolvent and is not backed by a government guarantee, depositors may lose their
money.
Currency crises are found to have the most detrimental impact on the poor, where a
currency crisis may reduce the income of the lowest quintile by 14.9%. Whilst, a currency
depreciation may result in higher remitted payments in local currency from abroad, the
negative consequences of a depreciation may more than offset this beneﬁt. Imported
inﬂation will make the cost of living more expensive, especially if imported goods have
8Further evidence, by Nikoloski (2013), shows that a ﬁnancial Kuznets curve may exist, where increasing
ﬁnancial sector development may initially lead to higher rates of inequality before eventually falling.
The Impact of Financial Crises on the Poor
© 2016 The Authors Journal of International Development
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
J. Int. Dev. (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/jid
a low elasticity of demand. Even if the poor consume local goods, if intermediate goods are
imported, then producers may pass these costs onto the consumer and local prices will still
rise. If a country has been ﬁghting devaluation, interest rate increases to defend the
currency may hurt the poor if they have obtained credit, as the poor will face higher loan
repayments. Moreover, with higher interest rates, even if the poor are not borrowers, they
may be subject to higher rental fees as landowners look to pass on their higher costs.
Debt crises are only shown to have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the income of the
poor in richer countries. Whilst debt crisis may result in higher taxes and lower social
spending, these effects may not be wholly felt by the poor in less afﬂuent countries. If
the poor do not work in the formal sector, they will not be subject to income tax and are
unaffected by tax increases as a government seeks to generate revenue. Indeed, if the tax
system is progressive and the tax increases are felt at the higher end of the income
distribution, once more the poor may be unaffected. A government reducing social
spending may be harmful to the poor; however, this depends on how well a government
targets its spending. If a government is incorrectly targeting the poor, then they should feel
no effects to cuts in spending. Moreover, spending cuts may end up harming the middle
classes (those higher up in the income distribution), a question I leave unaddressed for
future research.
In this study, we uncover a further valuable contribution to the academic literature. By
including a lagged dependent variable in the speciﬁcations, we still ﬁnd evidence that
growth may be good for the poor. Nevertheless, as ﬁnancial crises depress economic
growth, they may have additional consequences on the poor, and to what extent requires
further research, which may stimulate future policy debate.
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